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DEVELOPING AFRICA: THE SHRINKING U.S. SHARE
In recent years, overall U.S. foreign assistance has declined steadily as a percentage of the U.S. gross national product (GNP). The
precipitous reduction in official development assistance (ODA) is generally attributed to several factors: deteriorating domestic and
global economic conditions; the rise of fiscal conservatism in the U.S.; a retreat by the American public from foreign involvements; and ·
a significant political indifference on the part of influential senior levels of government. Following years of generous giving to the "havenots" of the world, the U.S. has slipped to the lower rungs of the ladder among Western aid-donor nations. Critics of America's foreign
aid program have marshalled an impressive arsenal of arguments for further circumscribing the Agency for International Development
(USA/DJ, America's vehicle for bilateral assistance. Reagan administration policy planners have mounted a sustained drive to inhibit the
role of the World Bank by limiting the amounts of replenishments to Bank affiliates such as the International Development Association
(IDA). Moreover, the administration and the Congress have joined to slash assistance levels to multinational agencies such as the African
Development Bank Fund. As always, Africa remains low continent on the totem pole in the annual U.S. foreign aid a/locations. Why this
continues to be so is the subject recently explored in the following interview TransAfrica Forum's Executive Director, Randall Robinson
conducted with Howard Wolpe (D .-Mich.), Chairman of the House International Relations Sub-committee on Africa. □

The U.S. has now slipped into thirteenth place in the
world in terms of foreign assistance as a percentage of
the Gross National Product (GNP). What will be the
cost of this decline both for the poor countries of the
world and for U.S. interests abroad?

WOLPE: It's extremely unfortunate that U.S. assistance as a percentage of the GNP is falling precisely at a
time when the needs of most developing states, particularly those of Africa, are facing some of their most difficult economic and political problems. These cuts in
American assistance are coming at the very moment in
which American interests are much more extensive in
Third World countries and in which we have a much
greater dependence upon Third World cooperation in
international forums and in the economic sphere.
The costs of the United States failure to participate
adequately in the effort to provide assistance to African
states and to the Third World generally are, in my view,
extensive. First, throughout much of the Third World,
particularly in Africa, the source of civil strife, political
instability, and military coups can be traced directly to
the social inequities which result from slow economic
growth and from poor economic performance. I think
two recent examples of coups in Liberia and Ghana
illustrate that phenomenom. In both of those countries,
deteriorating economic conditions combined with corruption led to the fall of those governments. Economic
assistance-if directed properly and given in reasonable
amounts-can really help provide the conditions for
economic take-off and for greater political stability.
Second, there's an additional cost to America. As the
richest nation in the world, our own credibiltiy is severe-

Congressman Howard Wolpe (D-Mich.)

THE SUPREME IRONY IS THAT THIS PRESENT
ADMINISTRATION SEES ITSELF AS UNIQUELY
HARDHEADED AND UNIQUELY ORIENTED
TOW ARD STRATEGIC CALCULATIONS IN THE
FORMULATION OF ITS FOREIGN ASSISTANCE
PROGRAM . ... THE END RESULT [OF ITS POLICIES] IS FREQUENTLY LESS ST ABILITY
RATHER THAN MORE ST ABILITY AND LESS SECURITY RATHER THAN MORE SECURITY.

ly damaged if we do not participate in a manner that's
commensurate with our resources in the effort to provide adequate amounts of assistance. It's not just a
question of prestige; it's also a question of.direct, inter-

dependent economic interests. If Third World states do
not begin to perform more effectively within an economic arena, then our own ability to expand our export
markets will be severely hampered . We have our own
self-interest in sharing economic growth and development of the Third World. As part of the same point, our
own dependence upon critical minerals and upon
petroleum from Third World states means that we have
to be concerned with conditions of civil unrest within
these states that can lead to an interruption of our access
to critical supplies. So, our own self-interest is directly
tied up in the success of Third World economic development initiatives.
Since the end of World War II, U.S. foreign assistance
has declined precipitously at the same time that the percentage of military assistance has grown. How do you
explain a policy that decreases development spending
while increasing military spending?

WOLPE : I think it's based on an abysmal lack of
understanding of the politics, the internal dynamics, of
developing nations. The supreme irony is that this present administration sees itself as uniquely hardheaded
and uniquely oriented toward strategic calculations in
the formulation of its foreign assistance program. The
real irony is that when they define the political stability
within developing states as being determined primarily
by the levels of military support that flows to current
regimes, they are intentionally taking an initiative that is
directly counterproductive to their own goal of enhancing the stability of these states because military assistance that flows to these governments frequently requires an increase in the debt burden that these states
carry. It represents an enormous diversion of resources
within these countries from the economic, social and
political problems they face at home into the military
sphere. So, the end product is frequently less stability
rather than more stability and less security rather than
more security. America's own interests are compromised together with those of the states that are recipients of our increased military assistance.
How would you characterize the Reagan administration's approach to the linkage between the U.S. strategic objectives and foreign assistance?

WOLPE: First the administration has given a higher
priority to providing military and security-related assistance rather than economic aid to African states. In the
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past two years, the administration's requests for foreign
military sales credits have climbed by over 300 percent.
In that same period, the level of security-related assistance (ESF) has climbed by 200 percent. This is in the
wake of declines in development aid and Africa's
mounting economic problems.
Second, American assistance is being concentrated in
areas where the U.S. is perceived to have strategic interests, not necessarily in the poorest and neediest regions
of the continent. Thus, Sudan is being given over $200
million in assistance, nearly one-fifth of all of Africa's
aid because of its support of our Middle East policy.
Kenya and Somalia are receiving large aid packages because they signed facilities agreements with us two years
ago and now allow American naval ships to use their
ports. We are also stepping up our aid levels and introducing new military and security-related assistance programs to a host of moderate African states that tend to
follow our western leads in international organizations .
Meanwhile, the poor get poorer. States which are perceived to be Soviet stooges are eliminated from our program or get cutbacks. The administration refuses, for
example , to aid Mozambique or to send an American
Ambassador to that country. Our aid program in
Ethiopia remains closed, and we have no Ambassador.
Of course, we continue not to have formal diplomatic
ties with Angola.
How should U.S. policy toward foreign assistance be
changed?

WOLPE: We should increase economic assistance to
Africa to encourage greater development efforts by
African governments themselves. We have an economic
interest in increased trade and a political interest in increased political stability arising from more economic
progress in Africa.
In addition to the North-South perspective, we should
avoid injecting an East-West perspective by granting aid
to countries like Mozambique and Angola because our
interest lies in their improved relations with the U .S.
Human rights considerations should be important as
we relate not just to a government but to its people, and
the latter is in the long-term interests of the United
States. Thus, we should limit military aid to Zaire and
refuse to aid segregated educational and other institutions in South Africa .
To the extent we feel we need to give balance of payments or budgetary aid, rather than specific development aid, we should seek to concentrate the former assistance on regions and sectors vital for development,
e.g. spare parts imports for agricultural cooperatives in
the rural areas rather than a high technology factory
making clothes for the elite.
In economic aid, we should focus more on aid to indigenous local development organizations like cooperatives, housing agencies, artisans, and village organizations in order to spur self-sustaining development
progress.
Finally, we must decrease proposed levels of military
aid, as we have done by well over $100 million in our
Subcommittee. Africa, by and large, does not face major external threats, and where it does (e.g. southern
Africa) our diplomacy, is by fa r, the most important
contribution we can make to regional peace. □

THE GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE:
HOW DOES U.S. FOREIGN AID MEASURE UP?

THE GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE:
WHAT IS THE U.S. GIVING TO AFRICA?

The United States has always taken pride in telling the
world that it is the best-"Number l "-in countless
fields . It was the first nation to land men on the moon.
Until recently, it was unquestionably number one in
military weapon superiority. And yet, as a donor of economic aid to developing countries, it has now fallen to
thirteenth place. Although the United States has the
largest aid program in terms of absolute dollar
amounts, it has dropped nearly to the bottom of the list
of aid-donor countries on the basis of assistance as a
percentage of GNP . According to AID's Congressional
Presentation: FY 1983, the U .S., which donates .27 percent of GNP, now ranks below:
• the Netherlands (.99%) • Australia (.480Jo)
• Norway (.82%)
• Germany (.43%)
• Sweden (.76%)
• Canada (.42%)
• Denmark (.72%)
• United Kingdom (.34%)
• France (.62%)
• Japan (.32%)
• Belgium (.49%)
• New Zealand (.32%)
Of the Western aid-donor countries, only Switzerland,
Austria, Finland, and Italy contribute less than the
United States.

Of the twenty-five poorest countries in the world,
eighteen are in Sub-Saharan Africa. Over the last
decade, the economic performance in these countries
has seriously declined. Food production has declined by
fifteen percent. Average annual growth in per capita
GNP is projected between one percent and negative onetenth of a percent between 1980 and 1990.
Nevertheless, the urgency of this situation is nrJt reflected in the level of direct foreign assistance which the
United States is providing developing countries in
Africa.
Rather than increasing aid to meet the tremendous
needs of these countries, development asistance to Africa will fall from $327. 5 million in FY 1982 to $323 .4
million in FY 1983 despite the critical situation that is
developing throughout the continent. PL-480 food aid
to Africa has dropped about fifty percent since 1980.
Table 2. TOTAL ECONOMIC AND
MILITARY ASSISTANCE
Fiscal Year 1983
Near East and
South Asia

Table 1. U.S. ODA IN COMPARISON WITH
ALL OTHER DAC COUNTRIES, 1965- 1980
(as percentage of GNP)
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As Table 1 illustrates, while official development aid
from other advanced nations has been rising in real
terms over the last fifteen years, U.S. aid has not been
keeping up with inflation. It is ironic that according to
the Overseas Development Council citizens of the U.S.
spent one billion more on being groomed and more than
six times as much on alcohol consumption than the U.S.
spent on overseas development assistance in 1980. If the
U.S. continues to ignore its interdependency, it may
prove to be disastrous not only for the developing world
but also for U.S. political and economic interests. D

In a letter to the Congress, Secretary of State Alexander Haig promised, "support for the development efforts of nations important to the U,S. and Western interests." Helping to meet Africa's most basic development needs, therefore, must not be important to this
administration.
The low priority accorded to Africa is most starkly reflected in a comparison of the distribution of foreign assistance dollars. Africa receives substantially fewer dollars than do other less needy regions of the world.
Europe receives a greater share of total economic and
military assistance dollars than does Africa. While the
Near East and South Asia region receives nearly sixty
percent of these funds, Africa receives a little more than
ten percent (See Table 2). As Congressman Lee Hamilton has argued, the U.S. has turned the foreign assistance program into a mechanism for helping two countries-Egypt and Israel. In this context, Africa's pressing needs remain unmet.
It is obvious that changes in the distribution of foreign assistance are sorely needed. This country needs to
re-think its priorities. And it needs to do so
immediately. D

REAGAN WATCH: THE WORLD BANK "AMBUSHED . .. IN THE PASS"

"Unfortunately, . . . Ronald Reagan came along
with his knife out for the World Bank and other international development banks. [World Bank
President] Clausen is trying to adjust to the needs
of the new era, but the administration is doing
everything it can to undermine him."
Henry S. Reuss (Dem.-Wis .), Chairman
Joint Economic Committee of Congress
The Reagan administration's policy toward foreign
aid is clear. They propose : less public aid, more reliance
on the private sector, a focus on security concerns, and
a preference for bilateral aid over multilateral aid . This
last concern has resulted in major change in U.S. policy
toward the World Bank and other multilateral development banks. They have, as John Sewell, President of the
Overseas Development Council said, "ambushed
[World Bank President] Clausen in the pass."
The Reagan administration has had a negative attitude toward multilateral assistance from the beginning.
The Republican platform opposes it : the conservative
wing of the party equates it with "one-worldism" and a
loss of control over how U.S. tax dollars are spent.
Reagan himself argued against it during his campaign.
After the election , 0MB Director David Stockman's
now famous "black book cuts" also entailed substantial
cuts in multilateral assistance. 0MB took the position
that replenishments agreed to by previous U .S. administrations should be renegotiated and that U.S. contributions to the World Bank should be reduced . In practice,
this would mean that the overall replenishments would
be sharply reduced because the U .S. would try to keep
up its percentage share-and thereby its percentage of
the vote-by prevailing upon other donors to reduce
their contributions as well.
Consequently, the U.S . Treasury Department negotiated with the Bank to stretch out the U .S. contribution
to the sixth replenishment of the International Development Association (IDA), the World Bank's soft loan
window, cutting $400 million this year from its contribution. Though committed to provide $1.08 billion,
the U .S. has provided just $700 million.
The administration, accusing multilateral institutions
of "financing socialism" in an interview given by
Undersecretary of Treasury Beryl Sprinkel, announced
that Treasury would undertake a major study of the
U.S. role in the banks. The report, United States Par-

ticipation in Multilateral Development Banks in the
1980's, issued in February 1982, recommended that:
• the bank slow and eventua lly stop expansion of its
lending,
• the bank move aggres~ively to "graduate" countries from bank fi nancing 10 private lending, and
• the U.S . impose severe limits on its fut ure contributions to the IDA .
The implication of these recommendations is that the
Reagan administration's policy will have its most
devastating impact on the " poorest of the poor." These
countries have come to depend upon the highly concessional interest rates provided them through the IDA's
"soft loan windows" to finance necessary projects in
areas such as road and power plant construction and to
meet the most basic human needs of their populations.

The Reagan administration's cuts, however, will mean
that far fewer of these loans will be made. The administration negotiated a U.S. share of $150 million in the
replenishment of the African Development Fund, a
reduction from 16.5 to 14.2 percent. This soft loan windo-N, concentrating heavily on agriculture, serves the
very poorest countries in Africa .
Both current World Bank President Clausen and
former President McNamara have been extremely critical of the administration's policies. "We must provide
additional resources for countries where the need is
greatest," says Clausen. The IDA is "not the Robin
Hood of the international financial set, nor the United
Way of the development community,'' he adds.
Mr. McNamara gives the Reagan administration
"very low marks" for its policy toward assistance to
low income countries. "We're leading to the rear," he
argues, "at a time when the U.S. shou ld be giving
strong positive direction to international assista nce efforts." The decision to cut, rather than to increase, contributions to multilateral institutions is "contrary to
U .S. national interests."

As it takes away vital contributions to development
assistance, the Reagan administration offers instead the
"magic of the market place" with little or no consideration for what that may mea n to the poorest countries in
Africa . Reagan reminds these countries that they must
"put [their] own financial and economic houses in
order" without substantial help from the U.S.
But such a strategy has little likelihood of success in
these countries, even if they are able to bear the tremendous costs which must be borne . First, the problems are
monumental: rising energy costs, world-wide inflation,
and the reduction in foreign assistance from both the
U.S . and other quarters has left these countries with
staggering debt burdens which these nations cannot reasonably be expected to pay back within one or two generations . Second, it is highly improbable that foreign investment will take up the slack. T hese countries are not
the most attractive for multinational investment. As
McNamara reminded the administration, "l don't have
$1 of my private funds invested in Bangladesh"-or in
Upper Volta or Mali for that matter. Third, as the external financing needs of these countries grow, they face
economic collapse, increasing poverty, unrest, and massive migrations. The Reagan administration will have to
re-think its policies or suffer the unfortunate consequences directly attributable to severe global economic
upheaval. □

PROFILE ON PEOPLE: C. PAYNE LUCAS OF AFRICARE

C. Payne Lucas

When you mention "development in Africa" to most
Americans, one person comes easily to mind: C. Payne
Lucas, the Executive Director of Africare, a private
voluntary organization (PYO) based in Washington and
working throughout Africa.
Born in the tiny town of Springs Hope, North
Carolina in 1933, C. Payne Lucas had no idea that he
would grow up to form a lifelong commitment to the
African continent. Following his graduation from the
University of Maryland (Eastern Shore), post-graduate
study at American University, and service in the Air
Force, Lucas, after a short stint at the Defense Department, took a position with the then newly-formed Peace
Corps, under Sargeant Shriver, in 1962. His hunger to
explore the world was fulfilled when he was sent to the
small West African nation of Togo to help run that
country's Peace Corps program. "First," he recalls, "I
had to find Togo on the map. I went with all these reservations, thinking of ... the heat and the 'primitive'
people. When I got there, my first assessment was ...
we really have been hoodwinked .... The people are
divine, the culture's wonderful, and I love the food!"
Five years of successful work with the Peace Corps,
mostly in Africa, earned Lucas the coveted "President
of the United States Award for Distinguished Federal
Civilian Service" in 1967 and a commendation from
President Johnson labeling him a "modern pioneer." In
1971, as a result of a close relationship with Niger's
then-President Hamani Diori, Lucas was urged to take
over a faltering private medical relief effort based in
Niger's capital, Niamey. "Even though I loved [Diori]
dearly," Lucas recounts, "I couldn't visualize leaving a
GS-18 job and taking on a non-profit organization that
didn't have a quarter." But, he did just that and has
been the mainstay of Africare for ten years.
Africare is unique in the international PYO community in that its individual contributions come chiefly
from black Americans. Lucas sees this black community
effort as important in dispelling the widely-held notion
that blacks do not give financial assistance to "their"
institutions . Today, he notes, "sixty-five percent of our
individual donors are black-and that's really impressive." This kind of grassroots support, along with
foundation , corporate, and U.S. government contribu-

tors, has moved Africare into the forefront of
America's economic assistance to Africa. With a
1982-1983 budget in excess of $6 million, over thirty
Africare projects are now in operation across Africa,
supervised by six Africare field offices.
While currently focusing on problems relating to
water, food, health, emergency refugee assistance, and
rural development, Africare in the near future also
plans to embark upon economic joint ventures with
American and African commercial interests. The soar-·
ing price tag of development in rural Africa (a well that
cost $5,000 in 1972 now has a $20,000 price tag), has led
Lucas and Africare to re-evaluate the basic requirements heretofore considered essential to the
development process.
Having felt in tune with USAID's "basic human
needs strategy" that evolved in the mid-1970's, Lucas
now shares a critical perception with other development
analysts in suggesting that "It's not worth much to increase the productivity of a farmer [who] does not have
the rural road to get his produce to market. There are
simply some major infrastructural problems in Africa
... that have to be addressed at the same time as ...
basic human needs." One way to approach this issue,
Lucas argues, is to extend U.S. bilateral support to infrastructural projects while at the same time increasing
U.S. funding to the multilateral development and lendng institutions. While pleased that the Congress has
mandated sixteen percent of all official development
assistance to flow through American PYO's, Lucas
acknowledges that the PYO role is likely to remain
limited to smaller and medium-range projects due to
funding limitations. Unless donor governments, therefore, including the U.S., increase bilateral ODA flows
to the building of infrastructure, Africa is surely to fall
further behind in the race for economic survival.
Africa's additional burden of millions of refugees and
displaced persons has only complicated that development process. Lucas notes that while U.S. assistance to
African refugees has indeed seen an increase this year, it
pales in comparison to assistance extended to southeast
Asian refugees.
And yet, even in the short term, Lucas, a "can-do"
optimist, sees both political and economic advancement
in Africa. There are no "basket-case" phrases in his
vocabulary. Africa has the cultural ethos, mineral and
agricultural resources, and human capabilities, he
believes, to work itself out of its current situation and to
become the continent of the future. Africare will continue its mission because its definition of development
embraces more than the technological.
Africare's commitment also extends to changing
American misconceptions about both Africa and development assistance in a number of ways by helping the
American public to understand that foreign aid is not a
"giveaway" and by reminding them that about one in
every seven American jobs results directly from U.S.
foreign assistance, trade, and investment.
In Lucas' words, "When you end foreign aid and foreign trade, you are taking bread out of American
mouths, and you are interrupting a dynamic and mutually beneficial progression into the future ." In the
coming years, Africare confidently expects to accomplish its current agenda-and much more. □
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